Abstract: This paper examines the probability of the success of city bid campaigns on the basis of quantified determinants for a total of 48 bids for the Summer Olympic Games between 1992 and 2012.
Introduction
Hosting of the Olympic Games supposedly affects the regions involved in different ways -politically, psychologically, sociologically and culturally, as well as economically.
1 Applications to host the Olympic Games (or other so-called mega-events 2 ) by cities and regions are based, in as much as rational decision- "Throughout the 1980s, World's Fairs and Olympic organizers turned to the mega-event as a panacea, a solution to the myriad of problems caused by economic hard times" (TEWS, 1993, p. 3).
making may be presupposed, on the expectation that the corresponding benefits will exceed the costs.
3
As for members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) who decide which cities will host the Olympic Games, in recent years they have at least received an evaluation report that compares the most important characteristics of the candidate cities.
In spite of the assumed rationality on the part of both the applicants and the decision-makers, the process of deciding who will host the Olympic Games has so far attracted relatively little attention in economic analyses. SCHAUENBERG (1992) analyses the voting procedure for the 1996 Olympic Games and reveals some irrationalities. SWART & BOB (2004) (2002) "accountability" factor includes the "ability to identify key target markets of importance to the event owners" and "to have an established and recognized presence in the marketplace as a bidding organization". The "political support" factor includes "financial stability of the city". Beside the problem of interpreting factors, it is hardly possible to quantify the items they encompass. Thus, if an applicant city wishes to enhance its 3 See SPILLING (1996, p. 321) . For an overview of ex ante studies on the costs and benefits of the Olympics see PREUSS (2004, p. 45) . Benefits may also occur in the case of failed applications. Thus, the international application campaign may in part be viewed as a relatively cheap form of image campaign (ANDRANOVICH, BURBANK, & HEYING, 2001, p. 127) . For example, the value of Birmingham's unsuccessful bid has been estimated at 25 million BP, although it only cost 5 million BP (ROCHE, 2001 ).
competitive position, it remains unclear which items should be ameliorated.
Furthermore, having spent effort on improvements, it is hard to measure whether the city's ranking for that item has really appreciated.
The limited academic attention to date is astonishing because -presumably as a consequence of the expected benefits -both the number of applicant cities and the related expenditure have increased significantly.
This paper examines, in our opinion for the first time, the probability of success of application campaigns to host the Olympic Summer Games 4 on the basis of quantified determinants. The analysis is based on a total of 48 bids to host the Olympic Summer Games between 1992 and 2012. Section 2 sketches the history of the bids and the awarding of the Games. Section 3 presents the data, the estimation model and the results of the econometric analysis. Section 4 closes with a conclusion.
2 Elements of the history of Olympic bids The period of time between the vote on the host city and the hosting of the Games, which is not constant over the history of the Games and can be up to seven years, should be taken into account here and in the following. For a description and an economic analysis of the corruption involved in the Salt Lake City scandal and the institutional changes afterwards, see MAENNIG (2002) .
Tab. 1 History of Olympic Bids
Phase Election Olympics Host City Contender Phase  1   1894  1894 1902 1903 1909 1912 1919 1921 1921 1923 1931 1936 1939 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 3 Data, methods, and results
Data
Analysis of the characteristics of successful Olympic bids is based on bids for the six Olympic Games from 1992 to 2012.
10 Data for the empirical analysis are taken from the bid books of the cities in question and from the reports of the IOC Evaluation Commission and relate to the year in which the IOC made its decision.
In the case of incomplete data or macroeconomic data not included in the bid documentation, data from the World Bank were used. In cases in which data provided by the bid books and the IOC Evaluation Commission differed, the latter 10 Bids prior to the 1992 Games provide a significantly lower amount of information.
source was used, since bid books sometimes tend to provide "embellished"
information.
11
The following empirical analysis makes use of the factors for a successful bid shortly after approval of its bid for the 2010 Games, Vancouver decided to relocate the speed skating oval -initially planned for the city centre -to the waterfront. The International Broadcast Center was also to be relocated. Assuming rational decision-making on the part of the IOC members, the reduced validity of the bid book data should tend to lead to a limitation in the information content of the data, which has to be taken into account below when interpreting the results. 12 The IOC demands a minimum capacity of 40,000 beds (IOC, 2004, p. 57) . In cases for which the accommodation capacities in bid books were cited as numbers of hotel rooms, this figure was multiplied by a factor of 1.8; see LEXINGTON CONSULTING (2002, p. 91 ) for a justification of this conversion factor.
capacity of the Olympic Villages (CAP OLYMP VILL) were taken from the bid books and/or IOC reports.
The national purchasing-power-adjusted per capita GDP (GDP) as defined by the World Bank was included as a socioeconomic determinant and adjusted for inflation based on the year 1995 in US$. In addition, the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOYMENT) and inflation rate (INFLATION) were also tested. The population size of the applicant country (POPCOUNTRY) and the population size of the applicant city (POPCITY) were also included, which can be regarded as an indicator of its political power.
To cover some socio-demographic influences, the development status of the applicant country was considered. First, the Human Development Index (HDI) as provided by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was used as a proxy of the development of a country (DEVELOPMENT). Second, the life expectancy of citizens of the applicant country can be used to measure the development status. Third, the level of corruption in an applicant countrypossibly an indicator for corruptive attacks of the relevant city during the bidding process -should be considered. Therefore, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International was used (CORRUPTION).
One often-discussed determinant in the election process of a host city is the "rotation of continents": Since the 1952 Olympic Games in Helsinki, the Games have not been held on the same continent for two consecutive Games. To cover the form of "implicit" continent rotation, two dummy variables were tested. The first dummy variable takes a value of 1 if a bidding city is located on the same continent as the host city of the previous Games. The second dummy variable counts the number of Games held on continents other than the applicant's continent. In addition, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a city applied consecutive times was included.
Finally, to take climatic aspects into account, the average temperature (TEMP) and relative humidity (HUMID) during the period envisaged for the Games were also taken into consideration. These data were taken from the bid books of the cities in question and the Evaluation Commission reports. (1986, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2005) ; Bidding Committees of the Cities.
Tab. 2 Descriptive Statistics

Method and results
Binary logistical regression is suitable for analysis of the yes/no decisions that determine whether an applicant city's bid is successful or not. Owing to the election process, a panel logit model has been chosen. This model should consider the condition whereby the Olympic Games were allocated at different times, i.e. every election is treated as a cross section in the panel. To cover possible originalities in each election, a panel logit model with fixed effects was also constructed. All variables defined in section 3.1 were included in the regression. Most of the variables proved to be insignificant. In particular, the economic determinants (e.g. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the overall explanatory power provided by the current regression model. The fixed effects and basic models correctly predict the result of the application process in 93.75% and 91.67% of cases, respectively. These high results, however, are relativized by the fact that whereas the models were able to predict failure in all cases, they could only correctly predict success in 50% and 33.33% of cases, respectively. The models thus achieve a high degree of explanatory power due to the high level of unsuccessful bids (42 of 48 cases). 
Tab. 3 Empirical Results
GDP, INFLATION, and
Conclusions
The Analysis of the goodness of fit showed that with around 94% of predictions correct, the fixed effects model was considerably more accurate in predicting unsuccessful bids (100%) than successful ones (50%). Future works that provide better models of successful bids could also quantify and take into consideration historical, political, psychological and bid-campaign-related factors. BIDDING COMMITTEE AMSTERDAM 1992 (1985 . Bid book (Vol. 1-3). Amsterdam.
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